Indiana Law Journal
Volume 90

Issue 3

Article 7

Summer 2015

Good-Cause Statutes Revisited: An Empirical Assessment
Adi Ayal
Bar Ilan University Faculty of Law, adi.ayal@biu.ac.il

Uri Benoliel
Academic Center of Law & Businss, urib@clb.ac.il

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Business Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Contracts Commons

Recommended Citation
Ayal, Adi and Benoliel, Uri (2015) "Good-Cause Statutes Revisited: An Empirical Assessment," Indiana Law
Journal: Vol. 90 : Iss. 3 , Article 7.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol90/iss3/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Good-Cause Statutes Revisited: An Empirical Assessment
ADI AYAL* & URI BENOLIEL**
One of the most vital debates in franchise law focuses on whether state or federal
law should adopt “good-cause statutes” (GCSs), which require franchisors to show
good cause before terminating contractual relations with a franchisee. The
traditional law-and-economics analysis suggests that GCSs are inefficient. This
inefficiency argument is based upon one central hypothesis: GCSs increase
franchisee free riding since they limit the franchisor’s ability to terminate the
franchise contract easily. The free-riding hypothesis has been significantly
influential in the development of franchise law, as is evident in state and federal
statutory regimes. To date, the majority of states and the federal government have
refused to adopt GCSs.
This Article investigates the free-riding hypothesis empirically and finds it
wanting. Direct examination of consumer satisfaction in one of the industries most
notoriously susceptible to free riding—hotels serving nonrepeat travelers—shows no
significant differences between franchises subject to “at-will” laws and those subject
to a GCS. We gathered a sample of 3442 franchised hotels, measured each one along
several dimensions of quality, and assessed potential differences using multiple
econometric methods. In none did the at-will states outperform the good-cause ones.
Implications of our empirical results on the debate over GCSs are discussed in
this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most vital debates in franchise law focuses on whether state or federal
law should adopt good-cause statutes (GCSs) requiring franchisors to show good
cause before terminating their contracts with franchisees.1 The traditional
law-and-economics analysis suggests that GCSs are inefficient. This analysis derives
from one central hypothesis: GCSs increase franchisee free riding by rendering it
significantly more difficult for a franchisor to terminate the franchise contract,
thereby impeding a central monitoring device used by franchisors.2 The logic of the
traditional free-riding hypothesis is at first glance simple and commonsensical:3
franchisees operate by selling products and services to consumers who rely on the
franchise trademark as a telling brand. Customers purchase from the franchisee
believing that the local venue is as good as any other franchised branch, essentially
presuming they are interacting with the chain rather than the individual provider.
Franchisees realize that much of their allure comes from national or regional
campaigns rather than their own efforts, and thus they conserve their own funds and
efforts by skimping where possible, that is, where the franchisor cannot catch them.
A free-riding franchisee will thus cut corners in services and products, relying on the
franchisor and other franchisees to uphold the brand reputation that brings customers
through the door. According to the traditional free-riding hypothesis, industries that
serve mostly nonrepeat customers, such as hotels and motels, are most prone to free

1. For articles expressing varying degrees of support for GCSs, see, e.g., Donald P.
Horwitz & Walter M. Volpi, Regulating the Franchise Relationship, 54 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
217 (1980); Peter C. Lagarias & Robert S. Boulter, The Modern Reality of the Controlling
Franchisor: The Case for More, Not Less, Franchisee Protections, 29 FRANCHISE L.J. 139
(2010); Tracey A. Nicastro, How the Cookie Crumbles: The Good Cause Requirement for
Terminating a Franchise Agreement, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 785 (1994); Paul Steinberg & Gerald
Lescatre, Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV.
105 (2004); Boyd Allan Byers, Note, Making a Case for Federal Regulation of Franchise
Terminations—A Return-of-Equity Approach, 19 J. CORP. L. 607 (1994); David Hess, Note,
The Iowa Franchise Act: Towards Protecting Reasonable Expectations of Franchisees and
Franchisors, 80 IOWA L. REV. 333 (1995). For seminal articles expressing varying degrees of
disagreement with GCSs, see James A. Brickley, Frederick H. Dark & Michael S. Weisbach,
The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination Laws, 34 J.L. & ECON. 101 (1991); William
L. Killion, The Modern Myth of the Vulnerable Franchisee: The Case for a More Balanced
View of the Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship, 28 FRANCHISE L.J. 23 (2008); Jonathan
Klick, Bruce Kobayashi & Larry Ribstein, Federalism, Variation, and State Regulation of
Franchise Termination, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 355 (2009); Bruce H. Kobayashi
& Larry E. Ribstein, Contract and Jurisdictional Freedom, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM
OF CONTRACT 325 (F. H. Buckley ed., 1999); Thomas M. Pitegoff, Franchise Relationship
Laws: A Minefield for Franchisors, 45 BUS. LAW. 289 (1989); see also Byron E. Fox & Henry
C. Su, Franchise Regulation—Solutions in Search of Problems?, 20 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
241 (1995); Mark Pruitt, Disclosure and Good Cause Legislation: “Where’s the Beef” in
Franchise Regulation?, 90 COM. L.J. 563 (1985); David A. Eisenberg, Note, Balancing a
Relationship—“Good Cause” Termination of Franchise Agreements in Michigan, 72 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 369 (1995).
2. See infra Part II.B.
3. See infra Part II.C.
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riding. In such industries, free riding saves costs while reducing future sales only
slightly and indirectly. At-will contracts then must be used by franchisors to keep
franchisees in line. A “shape up or ship out” strategy works best when contracts can
be terminated quickly and without recourse; thus, GCSs can get in the way. GCSs
are therefore argued to increase franchisee free riding.
This Article investigates the free-riding hypothesis empirically, by direct
examination of consumer satisfaction in one of the industries most notoriously
susceptible to free riding: hotels serving nonrepeat travelers. We gathered a sample
of 3442 franchised hotels and measured each one along several dimensions of
quality. We then used these measurements to compare the level of free riding by
franchisees in states where GCSs apply with that of franchisees in at-will states.
Perceived quality and customer satisfaction serve to proxy for franchisees’
investment of effort, as free riding typically results in customer complaints and
lower-than-average ratings. Those franchisees who free ride on franchise reputation
invest less in keeping their venues clean, their service prompt, and their customers
happy. They rely on brand awareness and an ongoing stream of new customers lured
by national advertising and chain-wide marketing. The results outlined below show
no significant differences in free riding between franchise operations subject to the
disparate legal regimes, thus casting considerable doubt on the validity of the
traditional economic analysis of GCSs.
This Article will proceed as follows: Parts I and II will provide context by
reviewing the statutory framework and the theoretical context underlying the debate
over the desirability of GCSs. Part III will present data and discuss the methodology
for empirically testing the conventional economic hypothesis—namely, that GCSs
reduce the ability of franchisor self-policing, thus increasing franchisee free riding.
Part IV discusses normative implications and potential interpretations of the
empirical results.
I. GOOD-CAUSE STATUTES: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
To date, only seventeen of the fifty states have adopted statutes requiring good
cause as a condition for the termination of a franchise contract by a franchisor.4
Under these statutes, good cause is commonly defined as a franchisee’s failure to
adequately comply with the franchise agreement.5 A franchisor terminating the

4. The seventeen good-cause states are Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-204(a)(1) (2011);
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 20020 (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133f(a) (West
2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2552(a) (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 482E-6 (West 2008); 815
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/19 (West 2008); IND. CODE § 23-2-2.7-1(7) (2007); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 537A.10(7) (West Supp. 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1527(c) (West 2011);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80C.14, subdiv. 3(b) (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87-404
(LexisNexis 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-5 (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-50-4 (2014);
TENN. CODE ANN. 47-25-1503 (2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-564 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 19.100.180(2)(j) (West 2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 135.03 (West 2009).
5. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-202(7)(A) (2011); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 20020;
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133f(a); HAW. REV. STAT. § 482E-6(2)(H); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.
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contract without good cause is obligated, under the GCSs, to pay damages to the
franchisee.6 Recoverable damages may include (1) a fraction of the franchisee’s
tangible assets (both real and personal) used with respect to the terminated franchise,
including sales outlets and facilities, offices, warehouses, trucks, furnishings,
equipment, and accessories;7 (2) loss of goodwill;8 and (3) loss of profits.9
GCSs are often explicitly mandatory, stating that any waiver of the statutory rights
by a franchisee in any franchise contract shall be void.10 GCSs allegedly have two
central purposes: first, to correct the perceived inequality in bargaining power
between franchisors and franchisees;11 and, second, to protect franchisees against
perceived franchisor opportunism.12 Without GCSs in place, franchisor opportunism

ANN. 705/19(b); IND. CODE § 23-2-2.7-1(7); IOWA CODE ANN. § 537A.10(7); MICH. COMP.
LAWS. ANN. § 445.1527(c); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80C.14, subdiv. 3(b); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 87-402(8) (LexisNexis 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-5; TENN. CODE ANN. 47-25-1502(4)
(2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.180(2)(j); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 135.02(4) (West 2009).
For cases in which courts found statutory good cause lacking, see, e.g., Volvo Constr. Equip.
N. Am., Inc. v. CLM Equip. Co., 386 F.3d 581 (4th Cir. 2004); Kealey Pharmacy & Home
Care Servs., Inc. v. Walgreen Co., 761 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1985); Atl. City Coin & Slot Serv.
Co. v. IGT, 14 F. Supp. 2d 644 (D.N.J. 1998).
6. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-208(b) (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133g(a) (West
2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2553(c) (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 482E-9(b) (West 2008);
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/26 (West 2008); IND. CODE § 23-2-2.7-4 (2007); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 537A.10(13); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80C.17, subdivs. 1, 3 (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 87-409 (LexisNexis 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-10 (West 2012); TENN. CODE
ANN. 47-25-1509 (2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-571(a) (2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 135.06(12)
(West 2009).
7. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2553(c)(1) (“[T]he numerator of the fraction shall consist of
the franchised distributor’s gross sales (in the most recently completed fiscal year) within this
State attributable to the terminated . . . franchise, and the denominator of the fraction shall
consist of the franchised distributor’s total gross sales (in the most recently completed fiscal
year) in this State . . . .”).
8. Tit. 6, § 2553(c)(2).
9. Tit. 6, § 2553(c)(3); see also ROGER D. BLAIR & FRANCINE LAFONTAINE, THE ECONOMICS
OF FRANCHISING 280 (2005); Roger D. Blair, Measuring Damages for Lost Profits in Franchise
Termination Cases, 8 FRANCHISE L.J. 3 (1988); Joseph Schumacher & Kimberly Toomey,
Recovering Lost Future Royalties in a Franchise Termination Case, 20 FRANCHISE L.J. 116 (2001).
10. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 20010 (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-133f(f); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2552(e) (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482E-6(2)(F);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 537A.10(4); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/41 (West 2008); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 80C.21 (West 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.220(2) (West 2013); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 135.025(3) (West 2009).
11. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 135.025(2)(b); see also Lagarias & Boulter, supra note
1, at 141; Dennis D. Palmer, Franchises: Statutory and Common Law Causes of Action in
Missouri Revisited, 62 UMKC L. REV. 471, 491 (1994); Pitegoff, supra note 1, at 289;
Christopher J. Curran, Note, Claims Against a Franchisor upon an Unreasonable Withholding
of Consent to Franchise Transfer, 23 J. CORP. L. 135, 152 (1997).
12. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 135.025(2)(b); see also Geib v. Amoco Oil Co., 29 F.3d
1050, 1056 (6th Cir. 1994); Bitronics Sales Co. v. Microsemiconductor Corp., 610 F. Supp.
550, 556 (D. Minn. 1985); Hartford Elec. Supply Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co., No. CV
96562061S, 1997 WL 297256, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 28, 1997), aff’d, 736 A.2d 824
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may take one of three central forms: (1) franchisors can force one-sided
modifications of agreements on franchisees by threatening to terminate the franchise
relationship at will;13 (2) franchisors may terminate the contract of an efficient
franchisee who fully complies with the contract in order to sell the latter’s profitable
unit to a new franchisee for higher franchise fees;14 and (3) the franchisor could
terminate the contract of an efficient franchisee simply in order to manage the
successful unit himself.15
States that adopted GCSs vary significantly in population and location.16

Good-cause states
At-will states
Figure 1. Relative geographical heterogeneity of good-cause states

(Conn. 1999); Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc. v. Branstad, 537 N.W.2d 724, 728–29 (Iowa
1995); McDonald’s Corp. v. Markim, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 158, 162 (Neb. 1981); Kubis
& Perszyk Assocs. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 680 A.2d 618, 626 (N.J. 1996); David L. Cahn
& Jeffrey S. Fabian, Mobility, the Home, and the Scope and Application of State Franchise
Relationship and Termination Laws, 30 FRANCHISE L.J. 107, 107 (2010); Robert W. Emerson
& Uri Benoliel, Are Franchisees Well-Informed? Revisiting the Debate over Franchise
Relationship Laws, 76 ALB. L. REV. 193, 196–97 (2012–2013); Palmer, supra note 11, at 491;
Pitegoff, supra note 1, at 289; Curran, supra note 11, at 152.
13. See Munno v. Amoco Oil Co., 488 F. Supp. 1114, 1118 (D. Conn. 1980); Michael J.
Lockerby, Franchise Termination Restrictions: A Guide for Practitioners and Policy Makers,
30 ANTITRUST BULL. 791, 833 (1985); Byers, supra note 1, at 621.
14. See Neptune T.V. & Appliance Serv., Inc. v. Litton Microwave Cooking Prods. Div.,
462 A.2d 595, 601 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983); BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 9, at 271.
15. See BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 9, at 271; see also Lockerby, supra note 13, at
834; Nicastro, supra note 1, at 801; Pruitt, supra note 1, at 565; Byers, supra note 1, at 621;
Hess, supra note 1, at 334.
16. See James A. Brickley, Royalty Rates and Upfront Fees in Share Contracts: Evidence
from Franchising, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 511, 518 (2002). See supra note 4 for a list of the
seventeen good-cause states.
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The vast majority of GCSs were adopted in the 1970s.17 However, to this day
most states do not have GCSs on their books. Since 1992, thirty states have
considered enacting franchisee-protection laws, including GCSs, but the proposed
laws have not passed.18 At the federal level, several GCSs have also been rejected.19
For example, in 1998 and 1999, the federal government declined to enact several
bills that would have made it unlawful for a franchisor to terminate a franchise
agreement prior to its expiration without good cause.20 To date, no general federal
law on franchise termination has been enacted.
II. THE TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF GOOD-CAUSE STATUTES
GCSs have been a source of intense debate and controversy among legal
theoreticians.21 Given the centrality of law and economics in legal scholarship, it is not
surprising that legal economists play a dominant role in this debate. The traditional
analysis along these lines contends that GCSs are inefficient, relying on a three-step
argument: First, franchisees are assumed to have an intrinsic incentive to free ride on
the franchise chain’s reputation, squandering the goodwill enjoyed by franchisors as
well as non-free-riding franchisees, thus reducing consumer welfare.22 Second, the
franchisee’s incentive to free ride is argued to be minimized via an essential control
mechanism: the ability of the franchisor to terminate any franchise contract at will.23
Third, GCSs, which prevent franchisors from utilizing the indispensable at-will control
mechanism, are understood to increase the level of franchisee free riding compared to
an at-will regime.24 These three arguments will be presented in more detail below, in
order to contextualize our critical and empirical analysis.
A. Franchisees’ Inherent Incentive To Free Ride
Individual franchisees at any franchise chain have a basic incentive to free ride on
the efforts of franchisors as well as those of the other franchisees.25 In other words,

17. Thomas M. Pitegoff & W. Michael Garner, Franchise Relationship Laws, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF FRANCHISING 183, 185 (Rupert M. Barkoff & Andrew C. Selden eds., 3d
ed. 2008).
18. Brickley, supra note 16, at 519.
19. See, e.g., Ernest A. Braun, Policy Issues of Franchising, 14 SW. U. L. REV. 155, 203–
04 (1984); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Terminations: Legal Rights and Practical Effects
When Franchisees Claim the Franchisor Discriminates, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 559, 562–63 (1998);
Horwitz & Volpi, supra note 1, at 218.
20. Small Business Franchise Act of 1999, H.R. 3308, 106th Cong. (1999); Small
Business Franchise Act of 1998, H.R. 4841, 105th Cong. (1998).
21. See supra note 1.
22. See infra Part II.A.
23. See infra Part II.B.
24. See infra Part II.C.
25. Brickley et al., supra note 1, at 104 (“Individual franchisees have the incentive to free
ride on the trademark . . . .”); Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Franchise Contracts, 2 J.
CORP. FIN. 9, 12 (1995) (“One type of behavior that has been analyzed at great length is the
free riding incentive created when franchisees jointly use a common brand name.”); Alan J.
Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The Case of Franchise Tying
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franchisees are enticed to produce a product or service of substandard quality relative
to that which would maximize joint profits for the entire franchise chain.26 Common
claims are that franchisees seek to conserve funds by neglecting the appearance of
their employees, skimping on workplace cleanliness, and overcharging customers.27
The individual franchisee incentive, according to this view, is to “cheat” customers
by providing them with low-quality products or services at the same price charged
by other franchisees in the chain who maintain higher standards.28
According to traditional economic analysis, the franchisee’s incentive to free ride
derives from two central cumulative factors: On one hand, the individual franchisee
fully internalizes the benefits of her free riding.29 On the other hand, the individual
franchisee incurs only part of the reputational costs suffered by the franchise brand
name due to her free-riding behavior.30

Contracts, 95 MICH. L. REV. 111, 118 (1996) (“Each franchisee will thus find it rational to
engage in opportunistic behavior at the expense of the franchise system—behavior that
involves . . . ‘free riding’ . . . .”).
26. Brickley et al., supra note 1, at 104 (“Individual franchisees have the incentive to . . .
produce a below-standard-quality product . . . .”); Victor P. Goldberg, The Free Rider
Problem, Imperfect Pricing, and the Economics of Retailing Services, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 736,
746 (1984) (“All of the franchisees have a short-run incentive to produce a below-average
product . . . .”); Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of “Unfair” Contractual
Arrangements, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 356, 358 (1980) (“[T]here is an incentive for an individual
opportunistic franchisee to cheat the franchisor by supplying a lower quality of product than
contracted for.”); Byers, supra note 1, at 620–21 (“Free riding occurs when the franchisee
reduces its costs by offering products and services below franchise quality standards . . . .”).
27. Roland E. Kidwell, Arne Nygaard & Ragnhild Silkoset, Antecedents and Effects of
Free Riding in the Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship, 22 J. BUS. VENTURING 522, 525
(2007) (“Examples [of franchisee free riding] include failure to follow company procedures
in terms of quality or service, overcharging customers, or lack of effort regarding appearance
of employees or the workplace.”).
28. Meese, supra note 25, at 118 (“This free riding will consist of attempts to ‘cheat’
customers, by providing them with products inferior to those ordinarily associated with the
trademark, presumably at the same price charged by those fellow franchisees who maintain a
higher level of quality.”).
29. J. Howard Beales III & Timothy J. Muris, The Foundations of Franchise Regulation:
Issues and Evidence, 2 J. CORP. FIN. 157, 159 (1995) (“The lower-quality franchisee will
benefit by the full amount of the savings from reducing quality . . . .”); Christopher R. Drahozal
& Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise
Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL. STUD. 549, 556 (2003) (“[T]he franchisee has an incentive to free ride
on the brand’s capital, since he captures the full savings from reducing his effort level . . . .”);
Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L.
& ECON. 223, 228 (1978) (“[I]f one franchisee allows the quality of his establishment to
deteriorate, he benefits by the full amount of the savings from reduced quality
maintenance . . . .”).
30. Beales & Muris, supra note 29, at 159 (“The lower-quality franchisee . . . will only
lose part of the cost.”); Janet E. L. Bercovitz, The Organizational Choice Decision in Business
Format Franchising: An Empirical Test, in ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT OF FRANCHISING
NETWORKS 38, 44 (Josef Windsperger et al. eds., 2004) (“The outlet manager bears only a
portion of the costs of such chiseling . . . .”); Goldberg, supra note 26, at 746 (“If a franchisee
reduces the quality of the product sold, it bears only some of the costs . . . .”); Rubin, supra
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In more detail, providing a lower-quality product or service allows the
franchisee to cut her individual costs.31 Consequently, the free-riding franchisee
can increase her individual profits.32 Since franchisees use a common brand as a
trademark, a reduction in quality by one free-riding franchisee has the effect of
reducing future demand facing all franchisees, not just that of the individual
franchisee providing reduced quality.33 The free-riding franchisee is thus able to
externalize a large portion of the reputational costs imposed on the franchise brand
by her behavior.34 Furthermore, the benefits of free-riding behavior are immediate

note 29, at 228 (The free-riding franchisee “loses only part of the costs, for part is borne by
other franchisees.”); Note, A Clarification and Reformulation of Prevailing Approaches to
Product Separability in Franchise Tie-In Sales, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1165, 1174–75 (1983) (“The
individual franchisee bears only a percentage of the cost of any consumer
dissatisfaction . . . .”).
31. Bercovitz, supra note 30, at 44 (“[T]he outlet manager may free-ride on the system’s
brand name and substitute cheaper, lower quality inputs in order to lower their store’s
operating costs.”); James A. Brickley, Frederick H. Dark & Michael S. Weisbach, An Agency
Perspective on Franchising, 20 FIN. MGMT. 27, 29 (1991) (“[T]he cost savings from providing
a lower quality product go directly to the given [free-riding] franchisee.”); Kidwell et al., supra
note 27, at 525 (“A franchisee engaged in a contractual relationship with a franchisor might
seek to lower his or her own costs by failing to participate in activities that would be
collectively profitable for the overall franchise network.”); Klein, supra note 25, at 12 (“[E]ach
franchisee can reduce its costs by reducing the quality of the product it supplies . . . .”); Note,
supra note 30, at 1174 (“Individual franchisees, on the other hand, have an incentive to lower
quality, which decreases the franchisee’s costs . . . .”).
32. Jean Wegman Burns, Vertical Restraints, Efficiency, and the Real World, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 641 n.197 (1993) (“[A]ny one franchisee has a financial incentive to
‘ride’ on the reputation being upheld by her fellow franchisees and to cut her own costs (and
hence increase her profits) by offering a lower quality product or service to the consumer.”);
Richard E. Caves & William F. Murphy II, Franchising: Firms, Markets, and Intangible
Assets, 42 S. ECON. J. 572, 577 (1976) (“A franchisee who reduces the quality of the good or
service he offers for a given price might increase his own profits . . . .”); Byers, supra note 1,
at 620–21 (“Free riding occurs when the franchisee reduces its costs by offering products and
services below franchise quality standards, thereby increasing its own profits . . . .”);
Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 372 (“The franchisee increases profits by cutting costs and offering
lower quality products.”); Hess, supra note 1, at 343 n.74 (“Franchisees free-ride by providing
a lower quality product to cut costs and receive higher profits . . . .”); Note, supra note 30, at
1174 (“Individual franchisees . . . have an incentive to lower quality, which decreases the
franchisee’s costs and increases the franchisee’s profit margin.”).
33. Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying
Contracts, 28 J.L. & ECON. 345, 349–50 (1985) (“The individual franchisee directly benefits
from the sales of the lower-quality product, and the other franchisees share in the losses caused
by decreased future demand.”); Rubin, supra note 29, at 228 (“All franchisees would lose
something as a result of this deterioration in one franchise: consumers would have less faith
in the quality promised by the trademark.”).
34. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of
Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 950 n.88 (“[F]ree-riding is an example of an
economic externality.”); Rubin, supra note 29, at 228 (“What is involved is a classic
externality problem.”); see also Goldberg, supra note 26, at 746.
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and obvious, while costs are both dispersed along the network and delayed to an
uncertain future.
Ultimately, the free-riding franchisee harms not only the franchisor and
non-free-riding franchisees but also consumers and aggregate efficiency.35
Consumers are normally unaware ex ante of free riding by individual franchisees or
of quality distinctions between stores belonging to the same chain and bearing a
common trademark.36 This problem is exacerbated when marketing is conducted
centrally by the franchisor, through national or regional advertising, online
reservation systems, and the like. Consumers therefore bear the cost of free riding,
“overpaying for a product of less than anticipated quality.”37 In the long run, free
riding reduces demand and deteriorates brand reputation—costs dispersed among all
those participating in franchise profits.
The traditional economic literature on franchisee free riding distinguishes
between two basic scenarios: high probability of repeat purchase by particular
customers versus low probability of the same.38 According to this distinction, the
franchisee’s incentive to free ride is lower where the probability of repeat customers
is high, as customers experiencing subpar performance will refrain from future
business at the same location.39 Repeat business to an individual franchisee unit thus
serves as a constraining factor on free riding, since the franchisee will bear the costs

35. See Beales & Muris, supra note 29, at 159 (“These lower quality franchisees benefit
at the expense of the franchisor, higher-quality franchisees, and consumers.”).
36. Klein & Saft, supra note 33, at 351.
37. Id.; see also Burns, supra note 32, at 641 n.197 (“Such free riding . . . harms the
consumer who receives a lower quality good although paying full price . . . .”).
38. See Rajiv P. Dant & Nada I. Nasr, Control Techniques and Upward Flow of
Information in Franchising in Distant Markets: Conceptualization and Preliminary Evidence,
13 J. BUS. VENTURING 3, 11 (1998) (“[Franchising r]esearchers classify businesses into repeat
versus nonrepeat industries. Although this repeat/nonrepeat dichotomy oversimplifies
consumer purchasing behavior, it is still useful in studying agency relationships in the context
of franchising as it highlights the differences in the consequences of shirking for the
franchisee.” (citation omitted)).
39. See Robert Dahlstrom & Arne Nygaard, A Preliminary Investigation of Franchised
Oil Distribution in Norway, 70 J. RETAILING 179, 184 (1994) (“In repeat selling situations the
owner of a specific outlet is interested in maintaining quality.”); Dant & Nasr, supra note 38,
at 12 (“[I]n repeat purchase industries, there are fewer opportunities for reputational abuse and
a lesser incidence of the free-rider problem by the franchisees . . . .”); Lorelle Frazer & Donald
J. Stokes, Franchising Operational Units in Australia, 2 FRANCHISING RES. 32, 34 (1997)
(“The propensity for free-riding to occur is lower where repeat customers form a large part of
an outlet’s sales.”); Kidwell et al., supra note 27, at 531 (“[R]epeated business establishes a
relationship between customer and operator that potentially lowers the likelihood of free
riding; it would be rational to decrease free riding on a brand name when there is a greater
chance that customers would offer repeat business.”); Klein & Saft, supra note 33, at 348 n.15
(“The creation of ‘neighborhood stores’ increased the repeat purchase probability and hence
reduced the incentive of individual franchisees to free ride on the group.”); Kobayashi
& Ribstein, supra note 1, at 340 (“Operators who rely on local repeat business are less able to
free-ride off the franchisor’s brand name . . . .”); Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract,
18 J. CORP. L. 245, 275 (“Operators who rely on local repeat business are less able to free ride
off the franchiser’s brand-name . . . .”).
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of her own shirking.40 Industries that are particularly likely to attract repeat
customers, and are therefore less prone to free riding, include those that serve local
populations, such as lawn care, laundry and dry cleaning, automotive services, health
and fitness centers, and homecare.41
Conversely, a franchisee’s incentive to free ride is particularly great where the
probability of repeat purchase by a particular customer is very low.42 In such cases,
the probability that a franchise will suffer the costs of losing customers already
unlikely to return renders free riding rational: decreasing effort levels and reducing
both monetary and personal investment in quality then becomes profitable.43 The risk
of losing customers in these situations is borne by the entirety of the franchise chain,
affecting the free-riding franchise only marginally.44 This is because the dissatisfied
customer is likely to refrain from future business with any branch within the franchise
chain where subpar performance was experienced. The local franchisee who caused
the initial dismay loses little, as in any case repeat business by the same customer
was unlikely. Overall, though, this scenario has each local venue externalizing the
costs of dissatisfied customers onto other branches within the same chain, potentially
creating a sizable overall effect.
According to the traditional law-and-economics perspective, industries that serve
mostly nonrepeat customers are therefore much more prone to free riding.45 This is

40. Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 29, at 557; see also ELIZABETH CRAWFORD SPENCER,
THE REGULATION OF FRANCHISING IN THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY 69 (2010) (“In the case of
a particular franchise unit, when repeat customers accrue to the benefit of that particular
franchisee . . . there are positive incentives for that franchisee to cultivate his customers.”);
Frazer & Stokes, supra note 39, at 34.
41. See James A. Brickley, Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from
Franchising, 42 J.L. & ECON. 745, 755 (1999); James A. Brickley & Frederick H. Dark, The
Choice of Organizational Form: The Case of Franchising, 18 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 416 (1987);
see also Dant & Nasr, supra note 38, at 11 (“Franchise outlets in repeat customer industries
are likely to cater to largely local populations; such industries may include sports equipment,
department, and clothing stores.” (citation omitted)).
42. Brickley et al., supra note 31, at 29 (“The incentives to free-ride are particularly high
at units where the level of repeat customers is low.”); Brickley et al., supra note 1, at 104
(“[T]he incentives to shirk on quality are highest in units where the level of repeat customers
is low . . . .”); see also ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF PRODUCT DISTRIBUTION 16 (2006) (“Free-riding is a particular problem when a franchisee
serves mainly nonrepeat customers . . . .”); Mick Carney & Eric Gedajlovic, Vertical
Integration in Franchise Systems: Agency Theory and Resource Explanations, 12 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 607, 610 (1991) (“The danger of free riding is greatest where repeat customers
constitute a small proportion of unit sales . . . .”); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract
Clauses and the Franchisor’s Duty of Care Toward Its Franchisees, 72 N.C. L. REV. 905, 951
n.224 (1994) (“Free-riding is potentially most severe at locations . . . where the probability of
repeat sales to that same customer is quite low.”); Klein, supra note 26, at 359 n.2; Hess, supra
note 1, at 343 n.74 (“A franchisee at a location with low probability of repeat sales to the same
customer has the greatest incentive to free-ride.”).
43. See Kidwell et al., supra note 27, at 531.
44. Frazer & Stokes, supra note 39, at 34.
45. See Brickley et al., supra note 1, at 104 (“[T]he incentives to shirk on quality are
highest in units where the level of repeat customers is low . . . .”); Brickley et al., supra note
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especially relevant in industries serving travelers, such as hotels, motels, and
car-rental agencies.46 Although there is potential for some repeat sales within the
same location in these industries, the likelihood of such sales is relatively low.47 For
example, although some travelers visit the same cities frequently and stay repeatedly
at favorite hotels, many others pass through a city only once and must stay at an
unfamiliar hotel.48 In many cases, therefore, “the hotel owner has little incentive to
please a one-time visitor.”49 The one-time visitor does not present the potential of
future business.50 Once the traveler has decided to stay at the hotel, there is little
recourse if, for example, the room is unclean or the service slow.51 The guest will
leave unsatisfied, but since there was little chance of the guest returning anyway, no
significant harm has occurred from the perspective of the hotel.52
B. At-Will Termination as an Essential Control Mechanism Against Free Riding
According to the conventional law-and-economics analysis, an essential mechanism
for reducing franchisee free riding is the ability of the franchisor to terminate the
franchise contract at will, namely without having to prove before a disinterested third
party that good cause for termination exists.53 As the late Larry Ribstein proffered:

31, at 29 (“The incentives to free-ride are particularly high at units where the level of repeat
customers is low.”).
46. Dant & Nasr, supra note 38, at 11–12 (“Nonrepeat purchase industries are those where
customers are generally mobile and less prone to repeat purchasing from the same outlet (at
least in the short-run) even though they may patronize the same franchise system; restaurants,
hotels, motels, and auto rental service franchises, in general, are considered examples of such
industries.”); see also Brickley, supra note 41, at 755 n.20; Brickley & Dark, supra note 41,
at 416; Brickley et al., supra note 1, at 121; Chris Manolis, Robert Dahlstrom & Arne Nygaard,
A Preliminary Investigation of Ownership Conversions in Franchised Distribution Systems,
11 J. APPLIED BUS. RES., no. 2, 1995, at 4.
47. Manolis et al., supra note 46, at 4.
48. Paul Ingram, Organizational Form as a Solution to the Problem of Credible
Commitment: The Evolution of Naming Strategies Among U.S. Hotel Chains, 1896–1980, 17
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 85, 86 (1996).
49. Id. at 86–87.
50. Id. at 87.
51. Id.
52. Id.; see also You-Ta Chuang & Joel C. Baum, It’s All in the Name: Failure-Induced
Learning by Multiunit Chains, 48 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 33, 36 (2003) (“[B]ecause travelers are
unlikely to return to the same hotel repeatedly and are unable to gauge its service quality
without prior experience, hotels have no incentive to provide good service in order to attract
future business.”).
53. Erin Ann O’Hara, Economics, Public Choice, and the Potential Conflict of Laws, 90
GEO. L.J. 941, 945 (2002) (The ability of the franchisor to terminate the contract at will is
“necessary to prevent individual franchisees from free-riding off the value of the trademark.
. . . The only way to ensure that [the franchisee] complies with her obligations is to enable the
franchisor to threaten immediate termination.”); see also Rubin, supra note 29, at 228 (“The
franchisor wants to eliminate any operations not maintaining the quality of the franchise.
Contracts calling for easy termination of franchises make it possible to avoid the period of
quality deterioration.”); Martin Edward Loeber, Comment, A DTPA Cause of Action for the
Terminated or Nonrenewed Franchisee: A Jack in the Box for the Unfair Franchisor, 43
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“Termination at will can be an important right for franchisers, since it may be the only
way they can effectively monitor their franchisees to prevent franchisees from
free-riding on and decreasing the value of the franchiser’s brand name.”54
The conventional assumption that at-will termination is an essential control
mechanism against franchisee free riding is based on the following analysis: when a
franchisor has the ability to terminate a contract at will, the franchisee will know that
detection of free riding results in swift termination and loss of lucrative business
opportunities within the chain.55 Furthermore, termination induces direct costs, such
as the loss of relationship-specific investments.56
Relationship-specific investments, also known as idiosyncratic investments, are
investments specific to a concrete franchise relationship.57 They are highly
specialized and tailored to that franchise relationship58 and, as such, are difficult or
impossible to redeploy elsewhere.59 Such costs are therefore sunk, having little or no
salvage value to the franchisee after contract termination.60 Relationship-specific

BAYLOR L. REV. 809, 816 (1991) (“[E]conomists argue that broad termination clauses are
necessary for the franchisors to protect the franchise from the inherent tendency of franchisees
to undermine the value of the trademark.”). Similarly, franchisors, and not only legal
economists, argue that the threat of at-will termination is the only means by which they can
protect themselves from free-riding franchisees. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 372
(“Franchisors argue that the threat of arbitrary termination is the only means by which they can
protect themselves from franchisees engaging in potentially opprobrious behavior.”); Hess, supra
note 1, at 342 (“Franchisors claim a need for an unrestricted termination power to protect the
value of their trademark and to insure a uniform standard of quality among all franchises.”).
54. Ribstein, supra note 39, at 248 (emphasis added).
55. See Beales & Muris, supra note 29, at 160 (“[T]he existence of the clause that has
caused so much trouble and given rise to so much sympathy for franchisees—the franchisor’s
right to terminate ‘at will’—becomes understandable. When such clauses are enforced, the
franchisee would know that detection results in swift termination. The clause is thus a
lower-cost method than litigation of reducing the franchisee incentive to cheat.”); see also
Brickley et al., supra note 1, at 104 (The franchisee’s incentive to free ride “will be lower if
franchisees who are caught cheating are punished by contract termination and thus lose any
remaining quasi rents on firm-specific investments.”); Byers, supra note 1, at 657 (“The
franchisor’s termination power is therefore essential—as both a threat to encourage franchisee
compliance and a means to actually purge noncomplying franchisees from the system—to
ensure that goods and services of requisite quality are supplied to consumers.”).
56. The following explanation is based on Uri Benoliel, Rethinking the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Abandonment Requirement in Mac’s Shell Service Inc. v. Shell Oil Products, 43
RUTGERS L.J. 77, 83–87 (2011).
57. Erin Anderson & Barton Weitz, The Use of Pledges To Build and Sustain Commitment
in Distribution Channels, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 18, 20 (1992).
58. Shankar Ganesan, Determinants of Long-Term Orientation in Buyer-Seller
Relationships, J. MARKETING, Apr. 1994, at 1, 6; Jan B. Heide & George John, The Role of
Dependence Balancing in Safeguarding Transaction-Specific Assets in Conventional
Channels, J. MARKETING, Jan. 1988, at 20, 21 n.1.
59. Anderson & Weitz, supra note 57, at 20; Heide & John, supra note 58, at 21 n.1.
60. See James R. Brown, Jody L. Crosno & Chekitan S. Dev, The Effects of
Transaction-Specific Investments in Marketing Channels: The Moderating Role of Relational
Norms, 17 J. MARKETING THEORY & PRAC. 317, 317 (2009) (“[T]ransaction-specific
investments . . . have little or no value outside of that relationship.” (emphasis in original));
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investments include “leasehold improvements,” fixtures that are attached to the retail
or commercial space and installed by the franchisee when setting up a new location,
such as walls, doors, cabinets, light fixtures, and floor coverings.61 Such
improvements may be significant and costly: for example, a Subway franchisee may
be required to invest up to $134,500 in leasehold improvements.62 The costs involved
are typically sunk, as franchisors often require the franchisee to lease, rather than own,
the land upon which the outlet is located.63 The lease arrangement grants the franchisor
the right to require the franchisee to evacuate the leased property upon termination of
the franchise contract.64 As a result, the leasehold improvements, which remain the
property of the franchisor, must be surrendered by the franchisee along with the
property, causing the free-riding franchisee substantial economic loss.65
Equipment expenditures are another form of relationship-specific investments
lost by a free-riding franchisee if the franchise agreement is terminated at will by a
franchisor.66 Depending upon the conditions of the space and the particular business
model, the required equipment expenditures can be extensive: for example, a
McDonald’s franchisee may be required to invest more than $1.5 million dollars in
equipment, including signs, seating, and décor.67 Frequently, much of the equipment
purchased cannot be used outside the franchise, thus making the expenditure
relationship specific.68 Obviously, the fast-food franchisee’s outdoor signs cannot be
used by the franchisee with any other franchisor.69 Similarly, franchise-specific décor

Ganesan, supra note 58, at 6 (“Transaction-specific assets are investments in durable assets
that are . . . not easily redeployable and have little salvage value in other relationships.”); Jan
B. Heide & George John, Alliances in Industrial Purchasing: The Determinants of Joint Action
in Buyer-Supplier Relationships, 27 J. MARKETING RES. 24, 27 (1990) (“Specific investments
are investments made by a firm that are of considerably less value outside the focal
relationship.”).
61. See Franchise Tutorial 20: Intro to Leasehold Improvements, CANADIAN FRANCHISE
ASS’N, https://web.archive.org/web/20140327184418/http:/cfa.ca/Publications_Research/Tutorials
/tutorial20.aspx.
62. See Subway Franchise Cost & Fees, FRANCHISE DIRECT, http://www.franchisedirect.com
/directory/subway/ufoc/915/ (last updated 2014).
63. See ANNE T. COUGHLAN, ERIN ANDERSON, LOUIS W. STERN & ADEL I. EL-ANSARY,
MARKETING CHANNELS 539 (7th ed. 2006); Klein, supra note 26, at 359.
64. See Klein, supra note 26, at 359.
65. Antony W. Dnes, ‘Unfair’ Contractual Practices and Hostages in Franchise
Contracts, 148 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 484, 487 (1992) (“Tenants normally make
alterations to commercial premises (leasehold improvements) which must be given up with
the property. If the franchisor fails to renew the lease the franchisee cannot adapt
improvements to other uses.”). Of course, the sunk nature of these costs, together with the
direct benefit franchisors accumulate from repossessing the improved property, are major
causes of concern for franchisees, as they point to potential franchisor opportunism.
66. Benoliel, supra note 56, 85–86.
67. See McDonald’s Franchise Cost & Fees, FRANCHISE DIRECT, http://
www.franchisedirect.com/foodfranchises/mcdonalds-franchise-07030/ufoc/ (last updated 2014).
68. Dnes, supra note 65, at 502.
69. Brown et al., supra note 60, at 317.
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is regarded as worthless outside the franchise’s chain.70 But beyond these
expenditures, many franchises operate with idiosyncratic procedures, necessitating
specialized equipment and investments well beyond those observable by customers;
as a result, contract termination typically necessitates resale of franchisee equipment
at a substantial loss.71
C. Good-Cause Statutes as Increasing Franchisee Free Riding
According to the conventional law-and-economics analysis, good-cause statutes
disrupt the essential control mechanism against franchisee free riding: at-will
termination.72 GCSs increase the costs of terminating a franchise contract, as
compared to an at-will regime, for four cumulative reasons.
First, GCSs generate documentation costs for a franchisor who wishes to
terminate a contract.73 The GCSs place the burden on the franchisor to prove that
there was good cause for terminating the contract.74 These statutes require increased
payments to a franchisee in the case of termination unless good cause can be
documented by the franchisor in a court proceeding, which naturally bears high
additional costs.75 Even clear cases of cause-based termination will thus be subject
to burdens of proof, leading to an ex-ante policy of procedures and complaints, and
early monitoring will be carefully documented.76 Documentation costs thus plague
franchise relationships even where no free riding occurs, as the necessary protocols
must be in place and documentation gathered throughout the life of the contract,
regardless of eventual use.
Second, GCSs generate significant litigation costs: by granting franchisees
protection from arbitrary termination, GCSs invite every terminated franchisee to
litigate the issue of whether or not good cause existed.77 Such litigation is costly,

70. Cf. Dnes, supra note 65, at 489–91. The secondhand value of trademarked franchise
equipment is normally one quarter of its original cost. See COUGHLAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 537.
71. Cf. COUGHLAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 537; Dnes, supra note 65, at 495; Warren S.
Grimes, Making Sense of State Oil Co. v. Khan: Vertical Maximum Price Fixing Under a Rule
of Reason, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 567, 586 (1998); Warren S. Grimes, Market Definition in
Franchise Antitrust Claims: Relational Market Power and the Franchisor’s Conflict of
Interest, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 243, 250–51 (1999).
72. Cf. Klein, supra note 25, at 30 (GCSs “entail the associated cost of making the
self-enforcement mechanism more difficult to use.”); Pruitt, supra note 1, at 569 (“By
disrupting the essential control component of franchise contracts, relationship statutes
[namely, GCSs] undermine the very benefits to be achieved through the franchising method
of distribution.”); Ribstein, supra note 39, at 275 (“Consider the example of a statute that
limits termination-at-will of franchisees . . . . Limitations on termination reduce the
franchiser’s ability to discipline shirking or free-riding franchisees.”); Byers, supra note 1, at
657 (“Good cause limitations on termination are the primary manner in which lawmakers have
attempted to protect the franchisee’s nonrecoverable investment. However, such laws can
hinder the franchisor’s ability to effectively police its franchise system.”).
73. See Pitegoff, supra note 1, at 310 n.88.
74. Id. at 309–10.
75. Brickley et al., supra note 1, at 104.
76. See Pitegoff, supra note 1, at 310 n.88.
77. Pruitt, supra note 1, at 569.
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both directly (court/attorney fees and the like) and indirectly (diverting attention
from business concerns to legal ones, tarnishing franchise reputation, and more).78
Litigation costs obviously limit the franchisor’s incentive to instigate proceedings,
making a threat to sue less credible and its use in preventing free riding ex ante less
effective. Of course, litigation costs might also lead to pretrial negotiations and
suboptimal settlements, making even those franchisees whose contracts are
terminated less worried about such a result.
Third, GCSs expose franchisors who terminate a free-riding franchisee for good
cause to costs stemming from errors. Namely, franchisors are required to bear the risk
of erroneous court decisions.79 A franchisor must not only convince itself that
termination was based on good cause;80 in order to prevail in litigation, it must also
convince external observers of the existence of good cause. Since legal results are
typically uncertain, courts may wrongfully decide that termination was arbitrary and
unlawful even when good cause existed. Given that GCSs shift the burden of proof and
make the franchisor’s case harder to win, error costs are borne mostly by the plaintiff,
further reducing the incentive to exercise the contractual threat of termination.
Last, GCSs expose the franchisor to the risk of a biased jury. More specifically,
when a franchisee can request a jury trial, the franchisor faces the additional obstacle
of juror bias, as jurors may favor the “little” franchisee over the “bigger” franchisor
and the local owner over the national chain.81 These costs and risks are reduced, if
not eliminated, if termination can be conducted at will.82
Law-and-economics scholars argue that, by disrupting the essential at-will control
mechanism, GCSs increase free riding in franchise relationships.83 As Professors
Bruce Kobayashi and Larry Ribstein straightforwardly claimed, “franchisee
protection laws increase shirking and free-riding.”84 Similarly, Professor Jonathan
Klick joined Kobayashi and Ribstein when he argued that the benefits of GCSs “may
be outweighed by their costs in preventing franchisors from disciplining shirking
franchisees.”85 Likewise, Professor Erin Ann O’Hara assumed that GCSs “transfer
wealth from franchisor to franchisee because they enable individual franchisees some
latitude to free ride off the company trademark and thereby earn greater profits.”86
Similarly, Professor Matthew Ellman implies that under the governance of GCSs,
“the free-riding problem is very hard to solve.”87

78. See Beales & Muris, supra note 29, at 159.
79. Pitegoff, supra note 1, at 310 n.88.
80. Beales & Muris, supra note 29, at 159.
81. Id. at 159–60.
82. Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293,
314 (1975).
83. See Matthew Ellman, Specificity Revisited: The Role of Cross-Investments, 22 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 234, 250 n.36 (2005); Klick et al., supra note 1, at 364; Kobayashi & Ribstein,
supra note 1, at 340; O’Hara, supra note 53, at 946.
84. Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 1, at 340.
85. Klick et al., supra note 1, at 364 (emphasis added).
86. O’Hara, supra note 53, at 946.
87. Ellman, supra note 83, at 250 n.36; see also Byers, supra note 1, at 657 (GCSs “can
hinder the franchisor’s ability to effectively police its franchise system.”).
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Given that prevailing wisdom is aligned with economic principles and paints a
black picture of GCSs, we decided to empirically assess whether common sense is
indeed based on fact and whether at-will termination is as important as many would
have us believe.
III. TESTING PREVAILING WISDOM: DO GCSS INCREASE FREE RIDING?
The scant existing empirical literature assessing the influence of GCSs on
franchisee free riding focuses on indirect indicators, such as the number of local
businesses within a given industry owned by franchisors versus franchisees or the
level of employment in franchise-intensive industries.88 These indicators are used
as proxies for the quality of franchise operations, with commentators attempting to
disentangle franchisee free riding from franchisor opportunism.89 In order to avoid
the pitfalls of indirect inference, we sought a database that would provide for more
direct evidence of free riding, ideally one that rates franchise operations on an
individual basis (rather than cumulative results for the entire state or industry).
Such data could then be examined for direct evidence of quality differences
between otherwise-similar franchise operations in states where GCSs were
enacted versus states where at-will termination is possible at the franchisors’
discretion. If the standardly accepted free-riding hypothesis is valid, we should
observe—in each typical franchise chain—the following phenomenon: the
average level of free riding of all the franchisee units located in good-cause states
should be higher than the average level of free riding among all of the franchisee
units located in at-will states.
With this in mind, we decided to examine, as a case study, the level of free riding
among franchisees in the hotel industry. Free riding is obviously impossible to assess
directly, as it takes many forms. We thus focused on its output: effects on customer
satisfaction and assessments of service and cleanliness. These are the results of effort
and care on the part of the service provider, with lower investment in quality assumed
to result in lower service and satisfaction. We chose the hotel industry as our case
study because, according to the traditional law-and-economics approach, it is
particularly prone to a high risk of franchisee free riding.90 Since the hotel industry
generally serves travelers who are nonrepeat customers, hotel franchisees do not
internalize the full costs of their free riding.91 We would thus expect free riding to be
prevalent, and where it is left unchecked, the investment in quality (and thus
customer satisfaction) should be low.
A. Methodology
In order to locate suitable candidates for comparison, we selected franchise
chains according to several criteria. We sought national chains with multiple
locations in each state and a sizable presence in both good-cause and at-will states.

88.
89.
90.
91.

See Brickley et al., supra note 1; Klick et al., supra note 1.
See Brickley et al., supra note 1, at 130; Klick et al., supra note 1, at 375.
See supra notes 45–46.
See supra Part II.A.
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This approach allowed for a sample size that reduced the effects of random
variation across sites and states. We focused on chains that serve many travelers
unlikely to return to the same location and that rely to a great degree on investment
in quality that is difficult to quantify (e.g., effort, employee supervision,
investment in service and quality). Thus, we focused on customer assessment of
service and cleanliness (which serve as proxies for investment of effort) and total
satisfaction (which captures multiple dimensions of quality). Free-riding
franchisees would be expected to achieve lower satisfaction ratings by customers
expecting certain standards that were not met. Last, we screened for franchises that
operate exclusively as franchisee-owned-and-operated businesses, in order to
avoid complications arising from including company-owned sites less prone to the
type of free riding we set out to examine. It should be noted that all conditions were
set to make free riding easier to discern using publicly available data. Thus, if the
prevailing wisdom regarding GCSs is correct, our test should pick up any
differences between states with and without such statutes.
In order to find suitable candidates, we used the well-known website
Entrepreneur.com to generate a list of ten chains meeting our initial criteria.92 From
this list, we decided to focus on the larger chains for sample-size purposes, and we
set our lower threshold to admit only those chains having more than four hundred
U.S. hotels. Where hotel chains featured different quality tiers (such as discount
hotels, suites, and luxury hotels), we assessed each tier as a separate chain to avoid
quality-specific attributes being lost and to screen for free riding in disparate
circumstances.
Screening for franchisee-owned hotel chains, operating nationally and consisting
of more than four hundred franchised hotels, led to a sample totaling some 3700
hotels across three relevant chains: Days Inn,93 Ramada,94 and Super 8.95 If the
free-riding hypothesis is valid, we should observe—in each of these three sample
chains—the following phenomena: The average level of free riding of all the
franchisee units located in good-cause states should be higher than the average level
of free riding of all the franchisee units located in at-will states. This should lead to
higher customer ratings for hotels located in at-will states compared to good-cause
hotels from within the same chain and quality tier.
In order to ascertain the average level of free riding among the franchises
subject to different laws, we took the following three steps for each of the three
selected chains across all states: First, we located—via an online hotel search
engine called freehotelsearch.com—all the hotels situated in good-cause states

92. These chains were Baymont Inn & Suites; Centerstone Inns, Hotels & Plaza Hotels;
Days Inn; Hospitality Int’l Inc.; Knights Inn; Microtel Inn & Suites by Wyndham; Ramada;
Super 8; Travelodge; and Wingate by Wyndham.
93. Days Inn has 1552 units in the United States. Days Inn, ENTREPRENEUR.COM,
http://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/daysinn/282270-0.html.
94. Ramada has 416 units in the United States. Ramada, ENTREPRENEUR.COM,
http://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/ramada/282743-0.html.
95. Super 8 has 1696 units in the United States. Super 8, ENTREPRENEUR.COM,
http://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/super8/282845-0.html.
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belonging to the chains in question.96 Second, for each hotel, we searched
Expedia.com for customer ratings left by actual guests regarding service,
cleanliness, and total satisfaction. These criteria were rated by hotel guests on a
scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being the least favorable and 5 being the most favorable.
The guest ratings for these criteria serve, in our study, as a proxy for the
franchisee’s level of free riding. Free-riding hotels typically receive low ratings by
guests under the service, cleanliness, and total satisfaction criteria, as these
qualities are difficult to specify in contractual terms, making cost-reducing
shirking by franchisees more prevalent. Conversely, non-free-riding hotels will
normally receive higher ratings. Third, we calculated average ratings in each
criterion and compared across states, contrasting good-cause with at-will states.
It should be noted that we selected Expedia.com as our database for guest
ratings because of its inherent protection from manipulation by self-interested
parties. The common fear with all rating systems is that participants will attempt
to “game the system” in order to bolster their reputation and attract potential
clients. With online ratings, there is always a risk of business owners inserting
positive ratings and false recommendations for their own facilities and negative
ratings for their competitors. On Expedia.com, only those who actually booked a
hotel through the site, paid for it, and had their stay verified can enter a review.97
The sheer financial cost of a franchisee posting a falsified review on Expedia.com
is prohibitive, thus bestowing credibility on those reviews found online.98
Furthermore, booking a hotel night through Expedia requires the reviewer to
undertake a credit card transaction on Expedia.com. The reviewer, therefore, does
not remain anonymous to Expedia, raising the probability that the company will
detect phony reviews. Ultimately, detection can prove costly for a forging
franchisee, as it may lead to government fines, private lawsuits, penalties imposed
by the review-hosting platform, and associated reputational costs.99 Given that such
significant costs may spill over, at least in part, to franchisors, many of them
contractually constrain the social-media practices of franchisees, thereby
increasing the franchisees’ forging costs.100

96. This website allows searching for Days Inn, Ramada, and Super 8 hotels within the
boundaries of each U.S. state. See, e.g., Days Inn Hotels in U.S.A., FREEHOTELSEARCH.COM,
http://www.freehotelsearch.com/U_S_A-Days_Inn-chain.html.
97. Press Release, Expedia, Inc., Expedia Overhauls Hotel Reviews: Consumers Can
Now Sort Verified Reviews by Shared Interest (Mar. 8, 2012), available at http://
mediaroom.expedia.com/travel-news/expedia-overhauls-hotel-reviews-consumers-can-now
-sort-verified-reviews-shared-interest-; Danny King, Expedia Touts ‘Verified’ Reviews,
TRAVEL WEEKLY (Dec. 29, 2011), http://www.travelweekly.com/travel-news/online-travel
/expedia-touts--verified--hotel-reviews.
98. The same is not true for other common review sites, such as TripAdvisor, where the
same (nonpaying) individual can post multiple reviews. See Dina Mayzlin, Yaniv Dover
& Judith A. Chevalier, Promotional Reviews: An Empirical Investigation of Online Review
Manipulation 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18340, 2012), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18340.pdf.
99. Id. at 14.
100. See id. at 15.
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After separately measuring—via Expedia.com—customer perceptions of
cleanliness, service quality, and overall satisfaction for each of the three selected
chains in both the good-cause states and the at-will states, we tested the
free-riding hypothesis for each chain and quality tier: namely, whether ratings
for franchisee units located in good-cause states are indeed inferior to ratings in
at-will states.
B. Data
The Days Inn chain has 490 hotels situated in good-cause states that were rated
by guests via Expedia.com. These hotels were rated by a total of 79,060 guests,
averaging 161 ratings per hotel. Similarly, we located 989 Days Inn hotels in at-will
states under the same conditions, rated by 139,563 guests via Expedia.com. This
resulted in an average of 141 ratings per hotel.
As for the Ramada chain, data gathering was more complex. This chain has three
different hotel tiers, which differ in price and services offered: Ramada Hotel,
Ramada Limited Hotel, and Ramada Plaza. The Ramada Hotel tier includes hotels
for the midmarket traveler. The hotels at this tier are full-service properties with
swimming pools, exercise rooms, room service, and free breakfast items. Ramada
Limited Hotels, on the other hand, are budget-oriented properties, typically with no
on-site restaurant. Finally, Ramada Plazas are full-service hotels, which are
conveniently located near city centers and/or airports.101 Since each tier at the Ramada
franchise chain—Ramada Hotel, Ramada Limited Hotel, and Ramada Plaza—has
different characteristics than the other tiers in the chain, our empirical test on the level
of franchisee free riding was conducted separately for each of the three tiers.
For the Ramada Hotel tier, we identified 112 hotels located in good-cause states
that had been rated by guests via Expedia.com. These hotels were rated by a total of
39,276 guests, leading to an average of 351 ratings per hotel. In at-will states, 190
hotels in this tier were rated by 54,115 guests, leading to an average of 285 ratings
per hotel. At the Ramada Limited Hotel tier, we located 31 hotels in good-cause
states, rated by 8598 guests and averaging 277 ratings per hotel. At-will states had
51 such hotels, rated by 8521 guests, for an average of 167 ratings per hotel. Ramada
Plaza had merely 9 hotels in good-cause states and 11 hotels in at-will states. These
hotels were rated by 4353 guests and 4381 guests, respectively, averaging 484 and
398 ratings per hotel.
Last, for the Super 8 chain, we located 631 hotels in good-cause states, rated by
69,022 guests, for an average of 109 ratings per hotel. At-will states have 928 such
hotels, rated by 100,755 guests, for an average of 109 ratings per hotel. Table 1
summarizes the available data.

101. See About Ramada, RAMADA WORLDWIDE, http://www.ramada.com/about-us/about
-ramada (last updated 2014).
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Table 1. Hotel chains in good-cause and at-will states
Good-cause states102

At-will states103

490
79,060
161

989
139,563
141

112
39,276
351

190
54,115
285

31
8598
277

51
8521
167

9
4353
484

11
4381
398

Number of hotels
Number of reviews
Average number of reviews per hotel

631
69,022
109

928
100,755
109

Total hotels
Total reviews

1273
200,309

2169
307,335

Days Inn
Number of hotels
Number of reviews
Average number of reviews per hotel
Ramada Hotel
Number of hotels
Number of reviews
Average number of reviews per hotel
Ramada Limited Hotel
Number of hotels
Number of reviews
Average number of reviews per hotel
Ramada Plaza
Number of hotels
Number of reviews
Average number of reviews per hotel
Super 8

C. Results
The folk theorem of GCS literature is that free riding in good-cause states exceeds
free riding in at-will states due to the disciplinary effect of franchisor termination.104
We should thus expect customer ratings of difficult-to-quantify variables to be higher
in at-will states relative to states in which GCSs were enacted.

102. These states include Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See supra note 4.
103. These states include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
104. See supra Part II.
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In order to test for free riding, we compared customer ratings along several
dimensions, beginning with average results for each hotel chain and quality tier
within good-cause versus at-will states. The results show that, on average, ratings for
all measures are similar across hotels subject to different contractual regulation,
thereby negating the folk theorem. Initial results are summarized in Table 2, with
further details and more nuanced investigation thereafter.
Table 2. Average rating per hotel
Good-cause states

At-will states

3.596
3.543
3.379

3.615
3.538
3.399

3.796
3.749
3.581

3.744
3.687
3.514

3.635
3.597
3.452

3.621
3.596
3.455

3.844
3.867
3.667

3.864
3.864
3.709

3.734
3.705
3.540

3.685
3.638
3.482

Days Inn
Service
Cleanliness
Total satisfaction
Ramada Hotel
Service
Cleanliness
Total satisfaction
Ramada Limited Hotel
Service
Cleanliness
Total satisfaction
Ramada Plaza
Service
Cleanliness
Total satisfaction
Super 8
Service
Cleanliness
Total satisfaction

Casual observation shows the distribution of ratings in states with a GCS to be
similar to states without one. Since a good picture is worth a thousand words, below
we show a graphical boxplot representation of the three categories for Days Inn
hotels (similar results were obtained for the other chains):
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Figure 2. Boxplot representation for Days Inn hotels: service
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Figure 3. Boxplot representation for Days Inn hotels: cleanliness
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Figure 4. Boxplot representation for Days Inn hotels: total satisfaction
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While the picture seems clear, appearances might be misleading. In order to verify
that our results indeed show GCSs have little effect on perceived quality, we
employed a variety of econometric methods designed to tease out any differences
that might escape initial detection. Since our purpose was to determine whether the
at-will sample outperforms good-cause hotels, we tested the data using a Wilcoxon
rank-sum test (also known as the Mann-Whitney U test), which examines two given
samples to determine whether one is drawn from a population with higher variables.105
If the folk theorem is correct, as the law-and-economics literature suggests, we would
be able to reject the null hypothesis that the populations are identical.
Across the five samples (Days Inn, Ramada Hotel, Ramada Limited Hotel, Ramada
Plaza, Super 8) and the three parameters examined (service, cleanliness, overall
satisfaction), in no case did the statistical test return a value showing any advantage to
at-will states over good-cause ones. Thus, in fifteen separate analyses, examining a
total of 200,309 reviews in good-cause states versus a total of 307,335 reviews in
at-will states, not one stratum returned a result lending credence to the prevailing
wisdom that GCSs increase free riding.106 The results therefore cast considerable doubt
on the validity of the traditional law-and-economics analysis of GCSs.
After assessing average ratings in the three categories and failing to find
differences between at-will and good-cause states, we decided to investigate further.
In order to rule out the possibility of skewed results due to some peculiarity of the
online ranking method, we reassessed each of the fifteen tests (five hotel chains, three
qualities that proxy for free riding) by further stratifying according to rating levels.
Thus, we disentangled the online ratings according to low-to-high strata rather than
focusing on average results. This allowed us to examine whether some rating levels
were more sensitive to differences among populations, differences that might escape
detection if averaged out by opposite biases in different rating levels. For example,
it might be that more significantly low ratings were given to hotels in good-cause
states than at-will states, even if the average ratings were similar due to an opposite
bias affecting high ratings.
In order to assess this possibility, we separated each of the fifteen strata into
groups, ranking low to high ratings according to the numerical scale used by Expedia.
Thus, we compared ratings in each group to similar ratings in the other group rather
than aggregating within group averages. We then applied a chi-square test and a

105. See H. B. Mann & D. R. Whitney, On a Test of Whether One of Two Random
Variables Is Stochastically Larger Than the Other, 18 ANNALS MATHEMATICAL STAT. 50
(1947); Frank Wilcoxon, Individual Comparisons by Ranking Methods, 1 BIOMETRICS BULL.
80 (1945). This test was warranted due to the populations of ratings not being distributed
normally. On a scale of 1 to 5, 1s are almost unheard of, while 5s are prevalent. The tails are
thus heavy and nonsymmetric. We therefore used a nonparametric test so as to avoid
unwarranted assumptions that might skew the results.
106. In order to reject the null hypothesis that the distributions are equal, the two-sided
Wilcoxon test must return a value below 5% or 1% (0.05 or 0.01), depending on the
significance criterion chosen. Actual results ranged between 28% and 97%, thus suggesting
(strongly) that the distributions are similar and GCSs have no effect on customer ratings.
Indeed, in one case, the result was opposite that predicted by the standard explanation. In the
case of Super 8 hotels, we were unable to reject a hypothesis that good-cause states had higher
ratings than at-will states, though only at the 5%, rather than 1%, level.
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Fisher’s exact test,107 but we again failed to find any statistically significant
difference among states along any of the dimensions examined. Below is a sample
table showing the distribution and analysis of ratings for total satisfaction at Days
Inn hotels (all other tables are available upon request and show similar results):
Table 3. Distribution and analysis of ratings for total satisfaction at Days Inn hotels108
Frequency, %, Row %, Col %

Low

Middle

High

Total

At-will states

195
13.18
19.72
66.33

643
43.48
65.02
66.02

151
10.21
15.27
71.56

989
66.87

Good-cause states

99
6.69
20.20
33.67

331
22.38
67.55
33.98

60
4.06
12.24
28.44

490
33.13

Total

294
19.88

974
65.86

211
14.27

1479
100.00

Statistic
Chi-square
Likelihood ratio chi-square
Mantel-Haenszel chi-square
Phi coefficient
Contingency coefficient
Cramer’s V

DF

Value

Probability

2
2
1

2.4580
2.5123
0.9410
0.0408
0.0407
0.0408

0.2926
0.2848
0.3320

Fisher’s exact test
Table probability (P)
Pr <= P

0.0010
0.2970

Note: sample size = 1479

We can thus safely say that not only are average ratings per hotel similar in goodcause and at-will states, but there is no statistically significant difference among any
group of reviewers at any level of satisfaction. Therefore, it is safe to say that
good-cause statutes do not diminish customer satisfaction along any dimension

107. Both tests are used to examine whether the results measured differ significantly from
the results expected under the null hypothesis—that is, whether reality differs from
expectations. See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 104–06 (5th ed. 2003). In
this case, they allow for examining whether the differences between states are random
fluctuations or whether they stem from the existence of GCSs in some states and not in others.
It turned out that GCSs had no statistically significant effect on customer reviews.
108. For each rubric in the table, four quantities are reported: Frequency (the number of
occurrences in the data); % (the percentage of the population falling within this rubric); Row
% (the percentage of the row population, for example, at-will states, falling within this rubric);
and Col % (the percentage of the column population, for example, low satisfaction, falling
within this rubric).
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measured. Since ratings for cleanliness, service, and overall satisfaction were
presumed to proxy for quality differences associated with free riding, there appears
to be no support in our data for the folk theorem that good-cause statutes induce free
riding and impede franchisor control of on-site quality.
IV. DISCUSSION AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
The conventional law-and-economics analysis of GCSs contends that they
increase franchisee free riding.109 This analysis rests on one central assumption: an
essential control mechanism against franchisee free riding is the ability of the
franchisor to terminate the franchise contract at will.110 The results of our empirical
tests show that the traditional economic approach is questionable. Specifically, these
tests demonstrate that the level of free riding in good-cause states, which prohibit atwill termination, is similar to the level of free riding in at-will states.
Several explanations might be offered for this phenomenon. One might argue that
the result applies to hotels but not to other industries. Of course, then one would have
to supply corroboration and a convincing explanation of why hotels are different.
Even if such a claim was considered, the hotel industry is sufficiently large to warrant
consideration in and of itself. Furthermore, most discussions of free riding in the
franchise industry focus on travel hotels as the paradigmatic case of nonrepeat
customers, relying on free riding to justify contractual mechanisms and regulatory
noninterference more generally. Even if our results do not generally extend to other
related industries, normative issues arise within the hotel industry itself, and these
will be discussed below.
Before we move on to our preferred interpretation of the results, it is important to
rule out several factors that, if present, would limit any conclusions drawn. It might be,
for instance, that the presence of GCSs does not increase free riding because contractual
terms in good-cause states override the effective protection of such statutes. However,
this hypothesis is ruled out by the mandatory nature of most GCSs, negating any
contractual waiver of the rights. Thus, a franchisee who agreed to a contract stipulating
at-will termination in a good-cause state would still be protected and could bring suit
based on the GCS regardless of contractual language to the contrary.111
It might also be that the opposite is true—that national franchises include
good-cause language in all their contracts, obviating at-will termination by
contractually conceding the case and essentially implementing GCS-like protection
even in at-will states. But such a claim is wrong on two counts: First, the facts are
different. Examination of the contracts shows that most include at-will termination
clauses or other clauses that do not satisfy the statutory good-cause requirement.112

109. See supra Part II.C.
110. See supra Part II.B.
111. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
112. For example, according to the Days Inns and Super 8 franchise contracts, the franchisor
may terminate the agreement for convenience at any time upon six months’ advance notice. See
DAYS INN WORLDWIDE, INC., FRANCHISE DISCLOSURE DOCUMENT 9 (2013), available at https://
www.cards.commerce.state.mn.us/CARDS/security/search.do?method=showPoup&documentId
={D01E9B8F-E1F5-4937-B901-7079A48A50BA}&documentTitle=42280&documentType=4;
SUPER 8, FRANCHISE DISCLOSURE DOCUMENT 9 (2013), available at https://www.cards.commerce
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Second, if all franchise contracts included good-cause language, there would be no
effective at-will states, making franchisor resistance to good-cause statutes
unnecessary. Since such resistance is strong, there must be a reason franchisors view
GCSs as problematic.113 We will return to this issue below, when discussing normative
recommendations.
In our opinion, the most appropriate interpretation of the results described above
relates to the means used to obtain them, namely the review sites from which we
drew our empirical data. Such review sites—namely, websites that allow customers
to post reviews about franchisees—are prevalent and widely used, and they serve a
primary purpose of allowing customers to give feedback regarding the business they
interacted with. Such feedback is directly aimed at the specific venue, but probably
more intended for the indirect communication with other customers considering the
same provider. For reasons detailed below, online review sites facilitate quality
control within franchise chains, as free riding will be directly disciplined by negative
customer ratings that reduce future business of potential customers. The Expedia
rating system allows all potential customers to incorporate observed results in their
decision whether to use the reviewed business’s offerings or to pursue a better
alternative. In other words, where online ratings are sufficiently trustworthy,
franchisors can rely on customer participation in monitoring wayward franchisees.
Such a system thus supplants at-will termination as a quality-control mechanism,
making the statutory differences between states with and without GCSs less
important. Ultimately, a successful online review system forces individual
franchisees to conform to expected quality levels, making the once-indispensable
at-will mechanism obsolete.
A. The Role of Review Sites
Online review sites force the free-riding franchisee to bear the costs of his or her
shirking, as even first-time visitors have the benefit of information regarding venue
quality. Since shirking on difficult-to-quantify investment in quality is policed by
customers, it need not be policed to the same extent as previously required by
franchisors. Thus, traditional explanations regarding GCSs inducing free riding
might have been true before, but it seems that online reputation mechanisms have
supplanted threats of contractual termination. Of course, our study does nothing to
corroborate (and nothing to dispute) the traditional explanations’ efficacy prior to the
advent of online rankings, and not all industries operate with such reputation

.state.mn.us/CARDS/security/search.do?method=showPoup&documentId={4DCCC980-68EE
-488C-9DA8-12B151322F53}&documentTitle=41631&documentType=4; see also Jonathan
Klick, Bruce Kobayashi & Larry Ribstein, The Effect of Contract Regulation: The Case of
Franchising 8 (George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 07–03,
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=951464 (“[M]ost franchise contracts contain at will
termination clauses.”).
113. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 372 (“Franchisors argue that the threat of arbitrary
termination is the only means by which they can protect themselves from franchisees engaging
in potentially opprobrious behavior.”); Hess, supra note 1, at 342 (“Franchisors claim a need
for an unrestricted termination power to protect the value of their trademark and to insure a
uniform standard of quality among all franchises.”).
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mechanisms. Still, given that Expedia is but one of many review websites and that
social media networks such as Facebook make online reputations the rule rather than
the exception, these findings are significant.114
In the hotel industry, the focus of our empirical study, online review sites have
become a widespread phenomenon. Sites such as Expedia, TripAdvisor, and Orbitz
allow travelers to write reviews and rate the hotels in which they have stayed.
Empirical studies show that online hotel reviews written by travelers influence
travelers’ booking decisions. For example, Ulrike Gretzel, Kyung Hyan Yoo, and
Melanie Purifoy conducted a survey among 7000 TripAdvisor.com users in order to
examine several factors, including the impact of travel reviews on travelers’
trip-planning processes.115 According to the survey, 91.8% of respondents avoided
places or services due to the content of online reviews posted by other travelers.116
Similarly, an experimental study conducted by Aurelio Mauri and Roberta Minazzi
tested, among other things, whether travelers consult comments of other travelers
before booking a hotel.117 The experiment shows that respondents’ hotel booking
intentions indeed increased where there was a prevalence of positive comments and
decreased in the face of negative ones.118 Other studies produced similar results.119
Empirical studies reveal more than the mere influence of reviews on booking
decisions; they also demonstrate that hotel revenues are significantly impacted.120 In
one study by Chris K. Anderson, a 1% increase in online reputation measures led to
a 0.54% increase in occupancy and a 1.42% increase in hotel revenues.121

114. See Courtney Christman, Reputation Management Through Social Media and
Online Reviews, MAINSTREETHOST (Mar. 3, 2014), http://blog.mainstreethost.com/reputation
-management-social-media-online-reviews#.VODAnPnF98E.
115. ULRIKE GRETZEL, KYUNG HYAN YOO & MELANIE PURIFOY, ONLINE TRAVEL REVIEW
STUDY: ROLE & IMPACT OF ONLINE TRAVEL REVIEWS 4 (2007), available at
http://www.tripadvisor.com/pdfs/OnlineTravelReviewReport.pdf.
116. Id. at 25.
117. Aurelio G. Mauri & Roberta Minazzi, Web Reviews Influence on Expectations and
Purchasing Intentions of Hotel Potential Customers, INT’L J. HOSPITALITY MGMT., Sept.
2013, at 99.
118. Id. at 102–04.
119. See, e.g., Beverley A. Sparks & Victoria Browning, The Impact of Online Reviews on Hotel
Booking Intentions and Perception of Trust, 32 TOURISM MGMT. 1310 (2011); Qiang Ye, Rob Law,
Bin Gu & Wei Chen, The Influence of User-Generated Content on Traveler Behavior: An Empirical
Investigation on the Effects of E-Word-of-Mouth to Hotel Online Bookings, 27 COMPUTERS HUM.
BEHAV. 634 (2011); Online Consumer-Generated Reviews Have Significant Impact on Offline
Purchase Behavior, COMSCORE (Nov. 29, 2007), http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press
_Releases/2007/11/Online_Consumer_Reviews_Impact_Offline_Purchasing_Behavior.
120. Cf. Qiang Ye, Rob Law & Bin Gu, The Impact of Online User Reviews on Hotel Room
Sales, 28 INT’L J. HOSPITALITY MGMT. 180 (2009) (showing that a 10% improvement in travel
review ratings increased online bookings by 4.4%).
121. CHRIS K. ANDERSON, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL MEDIA ON LODGING PERFORMANCE:
CORNELL HOSPITALITY REPORT 5 (2012); see also Jonathan Brinksman, How a Higher
TripAdvisor Ranking Can Help Hotels Book More Room Nights, MICROS.COM (Apr. 25, 2013)
http://blog.microsecommerce.com/index.php/uncategorized/how-a-higher-tripadvisorranking-can-help-hotels-book-more-room-nights/.
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B. Normative Implications
Given that online review sites dramatically impact hotel revenues, franchisors in
the hotel industry need no longer rely on the at-will termination mechanism to
discipline their franchisees. Customers, assisted by online review sites and the
lowered transaction costs of obtaining and disseminating information, are able to
directly punish hotels who free ride on chain reputations and provide subpar service.
Online review sites are not alone in supplanting at-will termination in franchise
contracts. Adam Badawi has shown that informal mechanisms operate alongside
formal ones and that at-will termination is far from the only way to make franchisees
conform to quality standards.122 In the classic carrot-and-stick terminology, where the
“stick” of contractual termination is difficult to effectuate, a “carrot” emerges—such
as using promises of additional franchises to incentivize investment in quality. In his
study, Badawi focuses on liquidated damages, which streamline contractual
enforcement and operate similarly to the type of at-will termination we study here—
but he finds that the use of liquidated damages is limited and negatively correlated with
informal mechanisms.123 In other words, “carrots” might be preferable to “sticks,”
especially where customers can punish franchisees directly.124 Where online review
sites operate effectively, the marketplace wields the “stick,” making courts and formal
proceedings dispensable. Since formal and informal mechanisms are viewed as
substitutes, franchisors would do well to avail themselves of positive reinforcements—
such as promising future business growth and additional franchise opportunities—
while leaving punishment to anonymous customers who post negative reviews online.
The question remains: To what extent do online review sites discipline businesses
beyond the hotel industry and beyond franchise operations? To the extent that the
data assessed above is representative of other industries, we should expect quality to
be maintained due to fear of negative reprisals—not by the franchisor or organized
groups but by the free flow of information attributable to modern-day Internet usage.
We focused on Expedia.com due to the nature of its control over review procedures,
but one could think of expanding the purview to almost any industry in which
customers exchange information online. For “old school” professors like us, the way
Expedia restricts ratings to paying customers inspires faith in the results. Still, one
might imagine that in the era of Facebook and near-constant and universal online
discussion, reviews may very well be a dependable source of incentives for provision
of quality even in the face of incomplete contracts and unverifiable information.
While we focused on franchise operations and the role of good-cause statutes, the
insight gained goes further. Where the online world provides for customer
interaction, exploitation of nonrepeat customers may be a losing prospect. When
information is freely available and customer dissatisfaction can be conveyed online,
businesses of all sorts need to adapt to a world in which the one-shot consumer is a

122. Adam B. Badawi, Relational Governance and Contract Damages: Evidence from
Franchising, 7 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 743 (2010).
123. Id. at 756.
124. See id. at 749. Interestingly, all lodging franchises included in Badawi’s study
incorporate liquidated-damages clauses in their contracts (including Super 8 and Days Inn, which
we studied as well). See id. at 752. This observation conforms with the prevailing view of hotels
as a nonrepeat industry in which free riding is rampant and strict oversight is necessary.
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disappearing species. The fear that good-cause statutes impede franchise operations
and induce free riding is thus overstated, especially in the online world.
Still, franchisor groups are notoriously opposed to GCSs, and attempts to enact such
statutes are usually stifled.125 If our conclusions are correct, what would explain this
attitude? First, opposition to GCSs might be a path-dependent result, explained more
by what was once true than what is relevant today. If at-will termination once operated
as an important factor constraining free riding, past resistance to GCSs is understandable.
Given that most public debates on the matter predate effective review sites being widely
available, we might be seeing the lasting impression of a dying world.
Second, it may be that at-will termination is still important in industries in which
review sites are unavailable or ineffective. Hotels, together with the rest of the travel
industry, are at the forefront of the online revolution, and it may be that results obtained
here are not universally applicable. While this may be the case, it merits investigation
into which other industries are characterized by effective online review, whether via
official sites devoted to the matter or via alternative means such as Facebook, Twitter,
and other widely available social media. It stands to reason that online review is a
growing industry, regardless of the form it takes, given that an ever-growing percentage
of the population is spending an ever-growing percentage of its time conversing with
others and offering opinions on almost everything under the sun.126
Third, the simplest explanation might be the truest—that franchisors oppose
GCSs since these statutes impede not just contractual monitoring but also
franchisors’ abilities to exploit the franchisees within their networks. Franchisor
opportunism was described above as consisting of three related behaviors: raising
fees and requiring additional purchases, revoking licenses in order to resell them to
new franchisees at higher prices, and revoking licenses in order to repossess the site
and run it as a company-owned franchise.127 At-will contracting is less necessary
today (in specific industries) than it formerly was, from the perspective of
constraining franchisee opportunism (i.e., free riding on the brand), but it retains its
power as a forcing mechanism. Proponents of GCSs thus have another weapon in
their rhetorical arsenal when arguing for enactment: franchises manage to maintain
equivalent quality with or without GCSs. If there are distributional reasons to prefer
protection of the weaker party, and if franchisees are assumed to have less bargaining
power, GCSs might very well be the answer.
Of course, the result we show is too narrow to support an argument for GCSs as a
whole. Some industries can rely on review sites; others cannot. One might consider
tailoring the law to specific industries based on the effectiveness of online reviews,
while others might argue that this approach is too regulation intensive and that simple
“yes or no” answers work better. In any case, one argument can no longer be made—
that at-will contracting is indispensable and that “franchisee protection laws increase
shirking and free-riding.”128 The customers of the hotels in our sample suggest otherwise.

125. See supra notes 18–20.
126. See Steve Olenski, Social Media Usage Up 800% for U.S. Online Adults in Just 8
Years, FORBES (Sept. 6, 2013, 10:13 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveolenski
/2013/09/06/social-media-usage-up-800-for-us-online-adults-in-just-8-years/.
127. See supra notes 13–15.
128. Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 1, at 340.
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CONCLUSION
Franchisee free riding lies at the center of the debate over the appropriateness of
GCSs. The traditional law-and-economics analysis distinguishes between industries
with repeat customers, in which the risk of franchisee free riding is low, and
industries with nonrepeat customers, in which the risk of franchisee free riding is
high. In these latter industries, GCSs are argued to be inefficient, as they are likely
to increase the level of free riding.129
In this Article, we empirically investigated the conventional economic analysis of
GCSs. We did so by attempting a direct comparison between the levels of franchisee
free riding in good-cause and at-will states. Online hotel reviews written by guests
allowed us to measure franchisee free riding with reasonable precision. Examining a
sample of three hotel chains—Days Inn, Ramada, and Super 8—we found no
significant differences in the level of free riding in good-cause states versus at-will
states in any of these chains. These results question the validity of the conventional
economic analysis of GCSs.
One potential explanation that we have provided for these results is that although
GCSs may curtail the at-will control mechanism against franchisee free riding, there is
a substitute, market-based control mechanism in place: online review sites. Franchisee
free riding is constrained not by an at-will contract but by the fear of negative consumer
reviews, which ultimately may dramatically reduce a franchisee’s revenues.
Although our empirical analysis focuses on the hotel industry, our results may
apply to other industries with nonrepeat consumers. We predict that normally, in
industries with effective online review sites and those in which consumer interaction
exists via social media, the at-will control mechanism will not prove an essential
control mechanism against franchisee free riding. Negative reviews by consumers
may serve as an adequate substitute for at-will contracts. As a result, good-cause
statutes, which prevent the at-will termination of the contract, are not likely to
increase the level of franchisee free riding in those industries. Since the same GCSs
offer the benefit of reducing the converse fear—of franchisor opportunism—their
enactment may very well increase aggregate welfare while protecting what are
usually small-business owners from large-chain operations.
Our results call for a novel subdistinction, overlooked so far in the debate over
GCSs. Industries with nonrepeat customers should be divided into two major groups:
those subject to effective consumer interaction via social media (including, but not
limited to, effective online review sites), in which the risk of free riding is relatively
low; and those without such consumer interaction, in which the risk of free riding
may be higher. Within the first group, the necessity of an at-will contract as a control
mechanism against free riding is questionable. This conclusion opens the door for
reconsideration of the adoption of GCSs, even in industries with nonrepeat
customers, as appropriate mechanisms for limiting franchisor opportunism and
protecting individual franchisees from unequal bargaining terms.

129. See supra Part II.C.

